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Abstract— The widespread recognition of the smart 
contracts has established their importance in the landscape of 
next generation blockchain technology. However, writing a 
correct smart contract is notoriously difficult. Moreover, once a 
state-changing transaction is confirmed by the network, the 
result is immutable. For this reason, it is crucial to perform a 
thorough testing of a smart contract application before its 
deployment. This paper’s focus is on the test coverage criteria 
for smart contracts, which are objective rules that measure test 
quality. We analyze the unique characteristics of the Ethereum 
smart contract program model as compared to the conventional 
program model. To capture essential control flow behaviors of 
smart contracts, we propose the notions of whole transaction 
basis path set and bounded transaction interaction. The former is 
a limited set of linearly independent inter-procedural paths 
from which the potentially infinite paths of Ethereum 
transactions can be constructed by linear combination, while the 
latter is the permutations of transactions within a certain bound. 
Based on these two notions, we define a family of path-based test 
coverage criteria. Algorithms are given to the generation of 
coverage requirements. A case study is conducted to compare 
the effectiveness of the proposed test coverage criteria with 
random testing and statement coverage testing. 
Keywords— blockchain, smart contract, testing, test coverage 
criteria 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchains as one form of distributed ledger technology 
have gained considerable interest and adoption since Bitcoin 
was introduced [1]. Participants in a blockchain system run a 
consensus protocol to maintain and secure a shared ledger of 
data (the blockchain). Blockchains were initially introduced 
for peer-to-peer payments [1], but more recently, it has been 
extended to allow programmable transactions in the form of 
smart contracts [2], [3]. Smart contracts are programs that can 
be collectively executed by a network of mutually distrusting 
nodes, who implement a consensus protocol (such as proof-
of-work [1] or proof-of-stake [5]) that digitally enforce 
agreements among nodes: neither the nodes nor the creator of 
the smart contract can feasibly modify its code or subvert its 
execution. Ever since being proposed and implemented by 
blockchain systems such as Ethereum [3] and EOS [6], smart 
contracts have been applied across a range of industries, 
including finance, insurance, identity management, and 
supply chain management. In our paper, we will assume 
Ethereum as the smart contract platform. 
Because smart contracts are entrusted by the users to 
handle and transfer assets of considerable value, they are 
subject to intensive hacking activities. Such hacking is more 
dangerous than that on a conventional network system, 
because once deployed on the blockchain, the contract 
becomes immutable, essentially creating a high-risk, high-
stake paradigm: the deployed code is nearly impossible to 
patch, and contracts collectively control billions of USD worth 
of digital assets. For example, there have been a plenty of 
well-documented attacks on the Ethereum smart contracts [7]: 
The reentrancy attack managed to steal  tokens valued $60M 
from a contract and ultimately led to the hard-fork that created 
Ethereum Classic (ETC) [8]. The Second Parity Multisig 
Wallet hack exploits well-written library code to run it in non-
intended context [9]. About $300M-worth cryptocurrency was 
frozen and (probably) lost forever. In April 2018, BecToken 
was attacked due to integer overflow on multiplication, 
causing an extremely large amount of tokens transferred to 
malicious accounts and the token price dropped to nearly zero 
[10]. The severe consequence of these attacks highlights the 
importance of verification before smart contracts deployment. 
In the literature, a number of approaches and tools have 
been proposed to verify smart contracts [11]–[16]. Most of 
them focus on detecting vulnerabilities, which are known 
code patterns that have been reported previously. Examples 
include re-entrancy, unchecked send, arithmetic overflow, and 
dangerous delegatecall [7]. Although vulnerability detection 
tools have been shown to be effective at detecting known 
dangerous code patterns, they are far from enough to verify 
the correctness of smart contracts. This is because not all smart 
contract defects involve known code patterns. Some, instead, 
are specific to the application logic of the particular contract 
under concern. These defects are referred to as logic error in 
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the empirical investigation by Kalra and colleagues [14]. For 
example, consider the real world example illustrated in Figure 
1. By mistake, the smart contract programmers put “return 
false;” at line 6 instead of line 9 after the loop. Logic errors 
of this kind cannot be detected by existing vulnerability 
detection tools, because no consistent code patterns can be 
summarized from them. Another reason why existing 
vulnerability detection tools might be insufficient is that there 
can be still plenty of unknown vulnerabilities that do not 
match any patterns reported by practitioners and researchers.  
For the above reasons, we believe that beside vulnerability 
detection, testing is still indispensable to guarantee the 
correctness of smart contracts. Note that the need of more 
research on systematic smart contract testing has already been 
advocated by several position papers [17], [18]. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, this direction has been largely 
overlooked in the research community. By contrast, the 
importance of testing is well recognized by smart contract 
developers. For instance, as one of the most widely used 
testing tools, Truffle suite [19] allows developers to encode 
test inputs and assertions into test scripts using JavaScript 
language. These test scripts are then executed on a blockchain 
simulation environment (Ganache). Such test frameworks, 
however, cannot guide the testing process in the sense that 
they do not tell the developers what kind of test scripts they 
should write, and whether existing test cases are sufficient. To 
address this issue, test coverage criteria [20] for smart 
contracts need to be defined. 
Test coverage criteria [21]–[23] are sets of rules that help 
determine whether a test suite has adequately tested a program. 
Many test coverage criteria have been proposed and 
empirically compared for conventional programs, including 
control-flow coverage criteria, such as branch-coverage [24], 
and data-flow coverage criteria, such as all-def-use-pairs [25]. 
Smart contracts, however, have several unique characteristics 
that can make existing test coverage criteria inappropriate. 
Firstly, the execution of smart contracts are organized around 
units know as transactions. The interaction between 
transactions across multiple contracts are crucial in the effects 
on the contract state. Therefore, test coverage criteria shall be 
designed according to the categorization of such interactions 
in practice, which is a factor not considered in conventional 
test coverage criteria. Secondly, within each transaction, the 
control flow can be transferred in an unexpected way. The best 
example is the famous DAO attack [8], which is caused by the 
unexpected reentrancy of the contract function. Conventional 
test coverage criteria are insufficient to address whole 
transaction control flow, because most of them are intra-
procedural.  While a few works do propose inter-procedural 
coverage criteria (e.g. [26], [27]), they only focus on the 
interfaces between functions.  
The above characteristics suggest the need to develop test 
coverage criteria based on how the execution of individual 
smart contract transaction traverses across contracts, and how 
transactions interact with each other in a sequence. The key 
challenge, however, is that both aspects involve potentially 
infinite number of coverage requirements. The number of 
possible execution paths of a transaction can be infinite when 
the contract code contains loops, and transactions sequence 
can also be extended infinitely. Therefore, directly defining 
test coverage criteria on them will make coverage testing of 
smart contracts intractable. 
In order to address this challenge, we propose the notion 
of whole transaction basis path set, which is a limited set of 
linearly independent inter-procedural paths from which all 
possible execution paths of transactions can be constructed by 
linear combination. The main novelty of this notion is that it 
extends the conventional definition of basis path by McCabe 
[28], which is for intra-procedural testing, to the inter-
procedural case. Besides, we also propose the notion of 
bounded transaction interactions, which are all possible 
permutations of transactions within a certain bound, linked by 
input/output. Based on these two notions, we define a family 
of path-based test coverage criteria for smart contract. 
Algorithms are given to the generation of whole transaction 
basis paths. A case study illustrates the effectiveness of the 
test coverage criteria using real world smart contracts with 
seeded logic defects. 
This paper makes the following main contributions: 
1) The proposal of practical path-based test coverage 
criteria for systematic testing of smart-contracts. 
2) The algorithms that address the enumeration of 
coverage requirements.  
3) Case study on a real world smart contract application 
to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed test 
coverage criteria. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the structure of smart contracts and define concepts. 
Section III define test coverage criteria based on these 
concepts. Section IV presents algorithms. Section V reports 
our case study result. Section VI discuss related work. Finally, 
Section VII concludes. 
II. STRUCTURE AND DEFINITIONS FOR SMART CONTRACT 
In this section, we first briefly present the program model 
of smart contract application on Ethereum. We then introduce 
the notions of whole transaction basis path set and bounded 
transaction interaction. A whole transaction basis path 
captures the control flow behavior inside one single 
transaction, while bounded transaction interactions captures 
the interaction between transactions.  
 
1: function checkNoExists(uint id) returns(bool){ 
2:    for (uint i = 0; i < numbers.length; i++){ 
3:        if (numbers[i] == id) { 
4:            return true; 
5:        } else{ // Shall put outside the loop 
6:            return false;  
7:        } 
8:    } 
9: } 
Figure 1: A logic error in the smart contract reported at [14]. 
  
A. Ethereum Smart Contract Program Model 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the model. At the minimal, 
a smart contract application on Ethereum is composed of one 
or more contracts deployed on the blockchain, and one or 
more external accounts that are owned by the users and hold 
Ethers as the cryptocurrency. The application relies on clients 
that synchronize with the network to obtain the latest 
blockchain contents and nodes that run the consensus protocol 
to pack transactions into the blockchain.  
Contracts are mostly developed in Solidity [32], which is 
a JavaScript-like, but typed, programming language. At the 
source level, contracts written in Solidity appear similar to 
classes in object-oriented languages. Figure 3 (a) give an 
example. Contracts can contain declarations of state variables, 
definitions of functions, modifiers, constructors, structure, and 
etc. Functions support encapsulation (visibility attributes) and 
can be statically overloaded. Contracts support interface and 
multi-inheritance in the C3 linearization style [15]. To enable 
deployment on the Ethereum platform, the contract functions 
are compiled into the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) 
bytecode and a piece of code called function selector is added, 
which serves as an entry point into the contract code. 
Whenever a function is called, the contract code starts 
executing at the function selector. The selector decodes the 
message and jumps into an appropriate contract function. 
Ethereum smart contracts support the custom handling of 
messages that do not specify a concrete function to call 
through the fallback function. 
After compilation, there are two ways to deploy (also 
referred to as create) a contract onto the Ethereum network. 
The first way is by a client sending a contract creation 
transaction with the deployment instruction, bytecode, and 
paying the creation fee in ether. The transaction is signed by 
the private key of an external account owned by the user, 
broadcasted to the network, and packed into a block. The 
contract instance is deployed as the result. The second way is 
by another contract executing a special EVM instruction 
CREATE (keyword new in Solidity). In both ways, the 
constructor will be executed to initialize the created contract. 
After deployment, contracts can be invoked with its 
external/public functions in three different ways. The first way 
is by the client sending a message call transaction, which 
makes a message call that contains target function selector and 
parameter data. Similar to the contract creation transaction, 
the message call transaction must be signed, broadcasted, and 
packed to take effect. It is a write-operation that will possibly 
affect other accounts, update the contract state and 
consequently, the state of the blockchain, and cost Ether. The 
second way is by another contract directly making a message 
call to invoke the function. This action is always transitively 
triggered by a message call transaction. In fact, every message 
call transaction consists of a top-level message call which in 
turn can create further message calls. Finally, the third way to 
interact with contract is by the client locally calling view/pure 
functions, which never modify the contract state. This kind of 
calls do not broadcast or publish anything on the blockchain. 
It is a read-only operation and will not cost any Ether. 
One important thing is that the message call transaction is 
always asynchronous, that is, after the client sends it to a node, 
the node is not obligated to execute it immediately. When the 
transaction does get executed, the result will consist of the 
outcome (success or revert) and execution logs. The client 
monitors the latest blocks to retrieve this result.  
From the perspective of testing, the core model of a smart 
contract program can be formalized as follows:  
A contract application dapp is a tuple <A, C>, where A is 
a set of external accounts and C is a set of contract. At the 
interface level, each contract c  C can be denoted as a 5-tuple 
< FP, FV, fc, fd, e>, where FP is a set of public/external state-
changing functions, which can be called by external accounts 
a  A; FV is a set of public/external pure/view functions, which 
can be directly called on c without any external account; fc is 
the constructor function of c; fd is the fallback function of c; 
and e is the ether value held in c. A function f is defined as a 
3-tuple <m,  (a0, a1. . . , aN), (r0, r1. . . , rM)>, where m is the 
function name, ai is the i-th parameter, and ri is the i-th return 
result. Each parameter or return result can be of primitive type, 
structured type, function type, or a special type called 
address, which can represent any external account or 
contract.  
For a dapp = <A, C>, a transaction T is defined as a 8-tuple 
<a, c, f, e, o, I, R, L>, where a  A and c  C. Let c=< FP, FV, 
fc, fd, E>, either f = fc, f = fd, or f  FP. If f = fc, the transaction 
T is a contract creation transaction, otherwise T is a message 
call transaction. Symbol e is the Ether value sent by the client 
with the transaction, which is used to pay for the execution fee 
or send to c; o is the execution outcome (success/fail); I = (a0, 
a1. . . , aN) represents values of f’s N parameters ; R = (r0, r1. . . , 
rM) represents values of f’s M return results; and L is a set of 
string recorded during the execution as logs.  
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Figure 2: Smart contract program model 
  
B. Whole Transaction Basis Path Set 
Based on the program model, the execution behavior of a 
smart contract application is determined by a sequence of 
transactions. Transactions may be represented by combining 
the control flow graphs (CFGs) of all functions that might 
possibly be executed in the transactions. We call such 
combined graph a transaction control flow graph (TCFG). An 
example is shown in Figure 3 (b). For each function f, the 
control flow graph for f has a unique entry vertex Entryf, and 
a unique exit vertex Exitf. If the function is a public/external 
function, then its entry vertex is also marked as a transaction 
entry vertex. The other vertices present statements and 
predicates in the usual way, except that each function call is 
represented by two vertices, a call-site vertex and a return-site 
vertex. In addition to the ordinary intra-procedural edges that 
connect the vertices, TCFG also contains a call-edge and a 
return-edge, which connect the call-site/return-site vertices of 
the caller function with the entry/exit node of the callee 
function, respectively. 
The part of TCFG introduced above is similar to the system 
control flow graph or supergraph [32] used in many works on 
inter-procedural program analysis problems. However, there 
are two important smart contract features that are not yet used 
in the previous example, and therefore demand additional 
constructs to handle. The example shown in Figure 4 shows 
these two features. This example is adapted from the real 
world contract attacked in the famous DAO incidence [8]. 
Feature 1: Exception-handling. EVM supports exceptions 
that can revert state for error handling. The function revert 
is used for flagging an error and reverting the current call. In 
the scenario that the exception occur in a callee function, it 
would be re-thrown in the caller function automatically, 
except when the callee function is called by low-level APIs 
such as send, delegatecall, call, and callcode. 
contract FishToken{ 
     
... 
  address public currentShark;     
  mapping(address => uint256) public balances; 
  address[] public participants; 
... 
 
function determineNewShark() internal { 
1:     address shark = participants[0]; 
2:     for (uint i=1;  
3:          i < participants.length;  
4:          i++) { 
5:        if (balances[shark]<balances[participants[i]]){ 
6:            shark = participants[i]; 
7:        } 
8:     } 
9:     if(currentShark != shark) { 
10:        currentShark = shark; 
11:     } 
}  
    
function addToParticipants(address addr) internal ...{ 
12:    if(participants[addr]!=null) { 
13:       return false; 
14:    } 
15:    participants.push(addr); 
    } 
 
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) ... { 
       .... 
16:    addToParticipants(to); 
17:    balances[msg.sender] -=value; 
18:    balances[to] += value; 
19:    determineNewShark(); 
    } 
 
function issueTokens(address be, uint256 amount)... { 
        ....         
20:     addToParticipants(be); 
21:     balances[beneficiary] += amount; 
22:     determineNewShark();         
} 
 
} 
transfer
determine
NewShark
issueTokensEntryt
16call
17-18
19call
ExitT
addToParticipants
Entrya
13
12
15
Entryi
20call
21
22ret
Exiti
Entryd
1
2
6
3
5
Exita
4
9
10
Exitd
16ret
19ret
20ret
22call
T F
T
F
T
F
T
F
 
(b) Transaction control flow graph of Pool-Shark 
Whole transaction basis path set for transfer: 
(t-16call-(a-12-15-)a-16ret-17-18-19call-(d-1-2-3-9-)d-19ret-)t 
(t-16call-(a-12-13-)a-16ret-17-18-19call-(d-1-2-3-9-)d-19ret-)t 
(t-16call-(a-12-13-)a-16ret-17-18-19call-(d-1-2-3-5-4-3-9-)d-19ret-)t 
(t-16call-(a-12-13-)a-16ret-17-18-19call-(d-1-2-3-5-6-4-3-9-)d-19ret-)t 
(t-16call-(a-12-13-)a-16ret-17-18-19call-(d-1-2-3-5-6-4-3-9-10-)d-19ret-)t 
| E | =  35         | V | = 32     Cyclomatic Number  = 35-32+2 = 5 
Whole transaction basis path set for  determineNewShark: 
(t-20call-(a-12-15-)a-20ret-21-22call-(d-1-2-3-9-)d-22ret-)t 
(t-20call-(a-12-13-)a-20ret-21-22call-(d-1-2-3-9-)d-22ret-)t 
(t-20call-(a-12-13-)a-20ret-21-22call-(d-1-2-3-5-4-3-9-)d-22ret-)t 
(t-20call-(a-12-13-)a-20ret-21-22call-(d-1-2-3-5-6-4-3-9-)d-22ret-)t 
(t-20call-(a-12-13-)a-20ret-21-22call-(d-1-2-3-5-6-4-3-9-10-)d-22ret-)t 
*We use ‘(‘ to denote entry node and ‘)’ to denote exit node. 
(a) code excerpt (c) whole transaction basis paths for the two transactions 
 
Figure 3: Illustrating example – Pool-Shark (hosted at [31]) 
  
These low-level APIs will return false instead when an 
exception occurs. 
In order to handle EVM exception semantics, we add a 
revert node Revertf for each function f that might revert itself 
or transitively call any function that might revert. For 
statements that might potentially revert (such as the require 
statement), we add a branching node to represent revert 
condition checking, and connect the revert branch to the revert 
node with a revert edge.  In addition, we add a cascading-
revert edge to connect the revert node in the callee function to 
that in the caller function. 
Feature 2: Call to unknown external function. With the 
built-in type address, smart contract can call the function 
of arbitrary external contracts. For example, at line 3 in  Figure 
4, msg.sender refers to the address of the caller, which can 
be any contract or account in the Ethereum. By invoking the 
low-level API call, the fallback function of msg.sender 
is called. As the implementation of this fallback function will 
not be known during testing, we have to assume every 
possibility, including calling back into itself, other functions 
of the same contract, or those of yet another external contact. 
This features open up a lot of unexpected control flow paths 
that we need to incorporate into TCFG and test thoroughly.  
In order to address this feature, we create a virtual sub-
flowgraph to represent what might possibly happen in the 
unknown external function, which is illustrated at the top-right 
corner of the TCFG in Figure 4. Essentially, this subgraph 
contains a loop of calls into any public/external functions of 
the contract. As the called functions might revert, the subgraph 
also adds a revert node to support cascading revert. 
 To summarize, the definition of TCFG is as follows: 
Definition 1: A transaction control flow graph (TCFG) 
for a smart contract c is a graph <V, E> where V is the set of 
vertices and E is the set of edges. Vertices in V are divided into 
subsets: Ventry, Vexit, Vexpr, Vpred, Vrevert represent entry, exit, 
expression, predicate, and revert nodes; Vcall, Vret represents 
call node and return node at the callsite; Vt-entry  Ventry 
represents transaction entry node. Edges in E are divided into 
subsets Eflow, Ecall, Eret, Erevert, Ecascading-revert. Eflow are intra-
procedural edges between nodes in V, and Ecall  Vcall  Ventry, 
Eret  Vexit  Vret, Erevert  Vexpr  Vrevert, Ecascading-revert  Vrevert 
 Vrevert.              
Definition 2: A node sequence p = (n1, n2, …, nk) is a 
whole transaction path (WTP) in a TCFG <V, E> if p satisfies 
the following requirement: (1) n1Vt-entry and nk  Vexit  Vrevert; 
(2) (ni, ni+1)  E; (3) Let f1, f2, …fw be the set of all functions 
in the contract and let p be a subsequence of p where all nodes 
in p are removed except for those in Ventry, Vexit, and Vrevert,  then 
p must match the following context free grammar: 
S ::= Entryf1  S Exitf1  |  Entryf1  S Revertf1  
…… 
S ::= Entryfw  S Exitfw  |  Entryfw  S Revertfw   
S ::= S S | ε        
The contract in Figure 3 and Figure 4 can both generate 
infinite numbers of WTPs. For the example in Figure 3, this is 
because of the loop at line 2-8. For that in Figure 4, this is due 
to the reentrancy at line 3 can recycle infinitely through the 
unknown external function. Therefore, directly defining 
coverage criteria for smart contracts with WTP could make 
testing intractable. To address this issue, we provide a solution 
inspired by the widely used and studied method of basis path 
testing proposed by Thomas McCabe [28].  
The idea of basis path testing is to consider the (usually 
infinite) set of paths in CFG as a vector space. The basis of a 
vector space contains a limited set of vectors that are linearly 
independent of one another, and have a spanning property: 
everything within the vector space can be expressed in terms 
of the elements within the basis. McCabe argued that by 
rigorously testing the path in the (always limited) basis set, 
most of the defects can be exposed, therefore there is no need 
to test every path in the  (potentially infinite)  whole set.  
Formally, for a control flow graph G with k edges e1, e2, …, 
ek, a path p is represented as a vector x1, x2, …, xk, where xi 
is the number of time edge ei occurs in p. A path set P is 
function depositFunds() public payable { 
1:   balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; 
} 
function withdrawFunds (uint256 withdraw) public { 
2:   _withdrawFunds(withdraw); 
} 
function _withdrawFunds (uint256 withdraw) internal { 
3:   bool result=msg.sender.call.value(withdraw)()); 
4:   require(result); 
5:   balances[msg.sender] -= withdraw; 
6:   lastWithdrawTime[msg.sender] = now; 
} 
3call
4
3ret
Entryi
5
6
Exiti
2ret
2call
Entryw
Exitw
Revertw
1
Entryd
Exitd
wcall
dret
Reverti
Revertext
Entryext
Exitext
depositFunds
withdrawFunds
_withdrawFunds
Unknown code from an external account
T
F
b
wret
dcall
 
Whole transaction basis path set for withdrawFunds: 
(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-)ext-3ret-4-5-6-)i-2ret-)w 
(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-)ext-3ret-4-Reverti-Revertw 
(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-dcall-(d-1-)d-dret-b-)ext-3ret-4-5-6-)i-2ret-)w 
(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-wcall-(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-)ext-3ret-4-5-6-)i-2ret-)w-wret-
b-)ext-3ret-4-5-6-)i-2ret-)w 
(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-wcall-(w-2call-(i-3call-(ext-b-)ext-3ret-4- Reverti-Revertw- 
Revertext- Reverti- Revertw 
Cyclomatic Number  =  28 - 25 + 2 = 5 
 
Figure 4: A smart contract with unknown external 
function call and exception-handling 
  
linearly independent if none of the path in P is represented by 
a vector that can be expressed as a linear combination of 
vectors of other paths. A linearly independent path set P is 
called the basis path set of G if every path in G can be 
expressed as a linear combination of paths in P. 
Previously, the basis path set is only defined intra-
procedurally on CFG. We now extend it to TCFG. 
Definition 3: Given a TCFG and a transaction entry node 
n, a path set P is called the whole transaction basis path set 
of n, or WTPBS(n) for short, if: 1) every path in P is a WTP 
that starts from n; 2) P is linearly independent; and 3) every 
WTP that starts from n can be expressed as a linear 
combination of paths in P.                                                     
Note that the set of paths that satisfies this requirement 
might not be unique. In this case, we can designate any of such 
sets as the whole transaction basis path set of n. 
C. Bounded Transaction Interaction 
The above definitions only involve the paths inside 
individual transactions. We now introduce the definition on 
inter-transaction control flow.  
Definition 4: Given a dapp <A, C> and upper bound k, a 
sequence q = (a1, c1, f1, o1), (a2, c2, f2, o2), …., (ak, ck, fk, ok) 
is called a k-bounded transaction interaction if: for every (ai, 
ci, fi, oi) there exists some values of e, I, R, L that makes < ai, 
ci, fi, e, oi, I, R, L> be a feasible transaction of dapp.         
III. COVERAGE CRITERIA 
Based on the above definitions, we are ready to define the 
coverage criteria for smart contract testing. Firstly we shall 
define the basic coverage requirement: 
Definition 5: Given a dapp and upper bound k, a k-
bounded transaction coverage requirement is defined as a 
tuple (q, w), where q = (a1, c1, f1, o1), …., (ak, ck, fk, ok)is a k-
bounded transaction interaction, and w is a set of paths p1,…, 
pk such that for i=1, 2, … k, pi  WTPBS(Entryfi) and ends 
with Exitfi if ok is success, or Revertfi if ok is revert.                     
A test case of a smart contract application dapp  <A, C> is 
defined as a tuple (, ), where  maps each external account 
a in A to its balance in Ethers and  is an input sequence (a1, 
c1, f1, e1, I1), …, (an, cn, fn, en, In). Each item (ai, ci, fi, ei, Ii) 
defines the input for a transaction: ai is the external account, ci 
is the contract, fi is the external/public function, ei is Ethers 
sent with the transaction, and Ii is the message call data. All of 
them can be either constant or calculated from transaction 
outputs, logs, view/public function call return values from 
previous transactions execution results.  A test case is valid if 
the input sequence can be executed on Ethereum from a state 
where none of the contract in C have been deployed (that is, a 
clear state).   
Intuitively, given a dapp <A, C>, we said that a test case s 
covers a k-bounded transaction coverage requirement r= (q, 
w)  if we execute s on a clear state, and the Ethereum 
blockchain generates a sequence of transactions T1, T2, … Tn 
from which we can find a substring Ti, Ti+1, … Ti+k-1 that 
matches the transactions and basis paths specified in r. A 
coverage requirement is feasible if there exists at least one test 
case that can cover it. 
Definition 6: Given a dapp and upper bound k, a set of 
smart contract test cases S achieves k-bounded transaction 
coverage criteria if for every feasible k-bounded transaction 
coverage requirement r, there exists at least one test case s in 
S such that s covers r. 
With the different values of k, we can obtain a family of 
coverage criteria with increasing numbers of coverage 
requirements, and therefore require increasing numbers of test 
cases to satisfy. When the value of k reduced to 1, it becomes 
essentially whole transaction basis path coverage without 
considering the interaction between transactions. 
IV. ALGORITHMS 
Testing a smart contract application with k-bounded 
transaction coverage criteria essentially involve four steps: 1) 
enumerate all coverage requirements; 2) generate at least one 
test case to cover each feasible coverage requirement r; 3) 
implement a test oracle to check test outcome correctness; 4) 
run every test case to find potential failure. In this section we 
introduce the algorithms for step 1, while the algorithms on 
test data generation and test oracle are put in future work. 
Algorithm 1 shows how to generate whole transaction 
basis path set. The idea is to start with a baseline WTP, then 
vary exactly one decision outcome to generate each successive 
WTP until the size of the path set reach Cyclomatic 
Complexity number. The proof on the correctness can be 
Input: a TCFG <V, E>, a transaction entry node n in Vt-entry 
Output: WTPBS(n) 
1:  Find p as the WTP that starts with n with the least predicate nodes  
2:  P  = {p}   
3:  V = {v  V | v is reachable from n}, E={(v1,v2)  E | v1, v2V} 
4:  while | P | < | E |  | V | + 2  //Cyclomatic Complexity number 
5:        Let p = (n1, n2, …, nk), find the smallest i such that (ni, ni+1) 
6:        has not occurred in any path in P.  
7:        Find another WTP p with the prefix (n1, …, ni, w), w  ni+1 
8:        if no such p is found, then break 
9:        P = P  {p},  p = p  
10: return P  
Algorithm 1: Whole transaction basis path set generation 
 
Input: a dapp <A, C> and the bound k 
Output: all k-bounded transaction coverage requirements 
1:   R  =    
2:   U = the set of all valid 4-tuples (a, c, f, o) where a  A, c  C,  
3:          f  public/external functions of c, o  {success, revert}      
4:   Q = all length-k permutations on U 
5:   while |Q|  0 
6:       pick a permuntation q and remove it from Q 
7:       for each (ai, ci, fi, oi) in q, pick a path pi from WTPBS(Entryfi) 
8:       pi must end with Exitfi if oi is success, or Revertfi if oi is revert 
9:       enumerate all such p1, p2, …, pk, add it into R. 
10: return R 
Algorithm 2: k-bounded transaction coverage  
requirement generation 
  
derived from the proof in [28]. We omit it due to a lack of 
space. 
Algorithm 2 shows how to generate all k-bounded 
transaction coverage requirements. Essentially, the algorithm 
is to enumerate all possible length-k permutation of 
transactions, and the enumerate all possible paths for each 
transaction from WTPBS(n) we derive from Algorithm 1. 
V. CASE STUDY 
We perform a case study on a real world smart contract 
application Pool-Shark hosted at [31]. The whole application 
consists of 12 contracts with 19 functions in total, among 
which 9 are public/external functions that can be a transaction 
entry. We choose Pool-Shark because its scale and complexity 
is representative of common applications hosted on Ethereum 
[33], [34]. To facilitate the repeat of our case study, we publish 
all the faulty versions and test cases at [35]. 
In the case study, we are mainly interested in two research 
questions: 
Q1: Are the k-bounded transaction coverage criteria more 
effective than conventional code coverage criteria, in the sense 
that test suites satisfying the former can detect more bugs than 
those satisfying the latter? 
Q2: Are the k-bounded transaction coverage criteria more 
efficient than random testing as a baseline, in the sense that a 
test suite satisfying our coverage criteria can detect more bugs 
than a test suite of the same size, but generated randomly? 
In order to address these two questions, we used the 
sufficient mutation operators [36] (such as operator-
replacement, variable-replacement, and statement-omission) 
to seed 22 mutation faults into the source code of Pool-Shark, 
producing 22 faulty versions with one fault in each version. 
As the test requirements quickly explode with an increasing 
bound k, we set the value of k as 2. 
As mentioned in Section IV, the whole testing process 
consist of four steps. In step 1, we apply the algorithms 
defined in Section IV to enumerate all the coverage 
requirements. With the value of k as 2, Pool-Shark generates 
729 coverage requirements in total. In step 2, we first use 
symbolic execution to solve the path constraints for each 
coverage requirement. The objective is to derive the contract 
state that can trigger a transaction sequence that cover the 
requirement. Next, we manually construct a transaction 
sequence that can get to this state. By combining the two 
sequences we get a complete test case. In step 3, we record the 
transaction execution outcome, event logs, and the return 
values of all pure/view functions of the correct version as test 
oracle. In step 4, the Truffle framework [37] is used to execute 
the test script. This process is repeated for statement coverage 
testing. The only difference is in step 2, where the coverage 
requirement is changed to every executable statement in Pool-
Shark. 
With the above process, we generate 81 test cases for k-
bounded transaction coverage criteria and 9 test cases for 
statement coverage criteria. Note that the number of test cases 
are significantly less than the number coverage requirements. 
It is due to the fact that one test case can cover multiple 
coverage requirements. Moreover, not all of the coverage 
requirements are feasible. To compare with random testing, 
we also construct a random test suite by randomly generating 
a transaction sequence with random message call data.  
The comparison result is shown in Table 1. It can be 
observed that the k-bounded transaction coverage testing is 
significantly more effective than statement coverage testing, 
as it detects nearly 55% more faults. In fact, all but two of the 
faults are detected by our testing technique. After manual 
examination, we find out that these two faults are indeed 
equivalent mutants and therefore, there is no test case that can 
detect them. At the same time, the k-bounded transaction 
coverage testing is more efficient than random testing: with 
the same number of test cases, it detects 18.2% more faults.  
This suggests our proposed criteria can be of practical value 
to smart contract developers. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
Existing vulnerability detection approaches can be 
classified according to their underlying techniques. Some of 
them rely on static program analysis. For example, systems 
including Oyente [38], Maian [11], Teether [12], Gasper [13] 
and the work by Grossman et al. [39] use symbolic execution 
to explore whether there exists paths that can trigger any 
known vulnerability, while ContractFuzzer [40] uses random 
fuzzing to find vulnerability instead. Other works rely on 
formal verification tools. For example, Zeus [14] uses abstract 
interpretation and constrained horn clauses, Vandal [41] uses 
Datalog theorem prover, and Grishchenko et al. [42] use F* 
theorem prover. Our work is complementary to these works. 
There is a plenty of work in the literature on testing 
coverage criteria [43]. Those that are widely referred to 
include the control flow coverage criteria [21], dataflow 
coverage criteria [22], logic coverage criteria [44], interface 
coverage criteria [24], and mutation score [36]. Our proposed 
k-bounded transaction coverage criteria share some of the 
ideas in the basis path coverage and interface coverage criteria. 
The merit of our work is that we extend these ideas to address 
the unique characteristics of the smart contract program model. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The importance of smart contract testing has been 
recognized, but there is a lack of research on how to 
systematically test smart contract application. In this paper, 
we analyze the unique characteristics of Ethereum smart 
contract model and propose the notions of whole transaction 
basis path set and bounded transaction interactions. Based on 
these two notions, we define k-bounded transaction coverage 
criteria for smart contract testing. We conduct an experiment 
Table 1: case study result 
Testing method 
#. of logic 
faults 
detected 
%. Of 
detected 
faults 
k-bounded transaction coverage 20 90.9% 
Statement coverage 8 36.3% 
Random 16 72.7% 
  
to study its effectiveness. The initial results show that testing 
based on k-bounded transaction coverage criteria can be more 
effective than the conventional testing methods such as 
statement coverage testing and random testing. In future work, 
we will address the test generation problem that has not been 
covered in this paper. 
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